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STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. §78A-4-103(2)(j) 1 
iv 
JURISDICTION OVER APPEAL 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78A-4-
103(2)0). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue 1: Did the Trial Court err in finding that the Town of Cornish failed to 
make a prima facie showing of affirmative fraudulent concealment by Mayor Floyd 
Veibell when the Town proved that Mayor Veibell failed to disclose to the Attorney 
General and members of the Town Council the fact that he induced the Town to pay him 
$10,000 to take early retirement from Hill Field so that he could conduct inspections on 
its water system without disclosing that he had already induced the Town's engineers to 
pay him over $70,000 to take early retirement to do the same inspections? (R. at 143-
145). 
Issue 2: Did the Trial Court err in finding that the Town of Cornish failed to 
make a prima facie showing of affirmative fraudulent concealment by Mayor Veibell 
when the Town established that Mayor Veibell failed to disclose to the Attorney General 
and members of the Town Council the fact that he used over $9,000 in Town funds to pay 
for preparation of a drinking water source protection plan that he had already been paid to 
prepare? (R. at 143-145). 
Standard of Review: "A Court appropriately grants summary judgment only 
when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. Thus, we review the district court's grant. . . of summary 
judgment for correctness, granting no deference to the district court." Wasatch Oil & 
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56(f) Motion by the Town and allowed discovery relating to the statute of limitations 
questions to proceed. The Court then held a hearing on Mr. Veibell Motion to Dismiss 
on February 19, 2008. Without notice to the parties, the Court elected to treat the Motion 
to Dismiss as a Motion for Summary Judgment and granted summary judgment in favor 
of Mr. Veibell's in a decision dated April 16, 2008. The Town filed its Notice of Appeal 
on June 4, 2008. 
C. Disposition by Trial Court 
The Court found that the Town had failed to make a prima facie showing that 
former Mayor Veibell had fraudulently concealed his breach of fiduciary duty, 
conversion, and taking money by false pretenses, and on that basis dismissed the Town's 
claims as being barred by the statute of limitations. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
L In 2006, Floyd Veibell came to a meeting of the Cornish Town Council 
("Town Council"), and threatened that if he was not made Town Treasurer by 8:00 A.M. 
the next morning he would file a criminal complaint against the Town. (R. at 451). 
2. The current Mayor was on the Town Council in the early 1990's when the 
Town embarked on a drinking water project. At that time he had had questions about 
rumors he had heard that Mayor Veibell had been paying himself for work he had done 
on the water project. (R. at 450). 
3. In fact, in 1997, another member of the Town Council asked the County 
Attorney to investigate Mayor Veibell's conduct. (R. at 450). 
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4. An investigation occurred, but neither the County Attorney nor the 
investigator ever interviewed any members of the Town Council to determine what their 
concerns were. (R. at 450). 
5. Instead, the County Attorney issued a letter "exonerating" Mr. Veibell, and 
the investigator threatened the council member who had made the request for 
investigation with a slander lawsuit if he mentioned the matter further. (R. at 128, 450-
451,602-03). 
6. Because of the unsettled nature of the events that had occurred in 1997, the 
current Mayor, John (Dyer) Pitcher, did not want to appoint Mr. Veibell to a position of 
trust with the Town. (R. at 451). 
7. Mayor Pitcher therefore contacted a lawyer and asked whether under the 
circumstances the Town could refuse to hire Mr. Veibell as the Town Treasurer. (R. at 
451). 
8. An investigation was conducted and in the fall of 2006, the lawyer reported 
to the Town that there was evidence that Mr. Veibell, while Mayor of the Town, had 
fraudulently induced the Town to pay him money for work done on the Water Project 
without disclosing that he was already being paid for that work (R. at 310-317, 331-342), 
had illegally used Town funds to pay his personal obligation to prepare a drinking water 
source protection plan he had contracted to prepare (R. at 19, 28), and had embarked on 
a systematic effort to conceal his fraudulent and illegal conduct by preparing all the 
vouchers for payment to himself without Council approval (R. at 310-317, 331-342), 
causing the payments and correspondence relating to payments he received to be mailed 
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to his home rather than to the Town offices (R. at 331-342), making a $9,000 payment for 
preparation of the drinking water source protection plan out of Town funds without 
disclosing to the Town Council he was doing that (R. at 310-317, 331-342), and by 
withholding information material to the County Attorney investigation, causing it to be 
incomplete and inaccurate (R. at 310-317, 331-342), then using the letter received from 
the County Attorney purporting to exonerate him to threaten any who would continue to 
question his conduct. (R. at 450-452, 603-03) 
9. Based on the results of that investigation, the Mayor determined that he 
should not appoint Mr. Veibell to be the Town Treasurer. (R. at 449-452). 
10. Given the threats that Mayor Veibell made against the Town and the 
current Mayor, the Town was counseled to bring this matter in District Court so that the 
matter could be conclusively determined in a Court of Law. (R. at 151-154). 
11. On May 13, 1993, at the regular meeting of the Cornish Town Council, 
"Clerk Rosie William read Resolution 93-2 to have Floyd Veibell be head of the water 
project until it is completed. Dyer Pitcher made the motion to accept Resolution 93-2 as 
presented, seconded by Larry Pitcher, Resolution passed." (R. at 5, 16, 19). 
12. Mayor Veibell represented to the Town that he would have to take early 
retirement from Hill Field to do this inspection work. (R. at 313, 331, 451). 
13. Mayor Veibell also represented to the Town that by paying him $10,000 to 
do the inspections, Hansen Allen & Luce, Inc., the project engineers, would reduce by 
$20,000 the amount the Town would be billed for the inspections. (R. at 332). 
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14. Resolution 93-2 stated the following: 
a. The purpose of this resolution is to (1) provide constant supervision and 
administration of the Cornish culinary water system project through 
completion, (2) provide the necessary manpower to set up monitoring 
and recording procedures for new water quality requirements mandated 
by congress and administered by the Environmental Protection Agency, 
and (3) to develop a Drinking Water Source Protection Plan as required 
by new State of Utah regulations. The period of this activity will extend 
to December 31, 1993. 
b. Be it resolved that The Mayor, Floyd Veibell's, annual compensation be 
increased by the amount of $10,000.00 due and payable January 10th 
1994 as compensation for the additional duties described above. 
(R. at 5, 19). 
15. At the time the Town Council passed Resolution 93-2, the Town Council was 
not aware that Mr. Veibell was also being paid as an independent contractor on the water 
project during the same period of time, as he did not disclose this material information to 
the Town Council at that time. (R. at 5, 21, 404, 417-429). 
16. Mayor Veibell had, in fact, before the May 1993 meeting, induced the Town's 
engineers to pay him $15.00 per hour to conduct the same inspection for which the Town 
agreed to pay him the $10,000 by telling them that he would be required to take early 
retirement from Hill Field to do the inspections. (R. at 313, 331, 450-452). 
17. On January 19, 1994, the Town of Cornish issued a check to Floyd Veibell in 
the amount of $10,82837. (R. at 5, 28). 
18. In a memo dated February 9, 1995, William S. Bigelow represented that 
"[t]he funding agencies, the Utah Drinking Water Board and Farmers Home 
Administration, Cornish Town and Hansen, Allen & Luce, Inc., the project engineers, all 
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agreed that the most effective and efficient arrangement for project inspection would be 
for the Mayor of Cornish, C. Floyd Veibell, to serve as project inspector for the project." 
(R. at 6, 30). 
19. "Mayor Veibell volunteered to take advantage of an early retirement 
program from his full time employment so as to be available to serve as the Town's 
resident inspector," the memo said. (R. at 6, 30). 
20. On April 13, 1993, Mr. Veibell submitted an expense voucher in the 
amount of $1,105.00 for services performed under his $15.00 per hour contract to 
perform inspections relating to the water project. (R. at 6, 32). 
21. Over the next two and one half years, long after the project had been 
completed, Mayor Veibell submitted expense vouchers and received payments, until all 
the project funds available had been fully depleted. This was money the Town had to 
borrow and is paying back to this day. Over that time period, Mayor Veibell billed and 
received payment of over $70,000 (R. at 5-10, 32-109, 116-120). 
22. None of the expense vouchers or payments were ever presented to the 
Town Council for approval. In fact, members of the Town Council first learned of these 
payments in connection with the preparation of the Complaint in this matter. (R. at 10, 
21-26). 
23. At all relevant times the records relating to these transactions were kept at 
the home of and in the custody of Floyd Veibell. (R. at 310-317, 331-342). 
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24. In 1997 a member of the Town Council began to question whether Mr. 
Veibell was acting in compliance with his duties in connection with the water project and 
asked the Attorney General to investigate Mr. Veibell's conduct. (R. at 10, 602-603). 
25. In connection with that investigation, Mr. Veibell represented to the 
investigator that he had been hired by the Town and produced a copy of Resolution 93-2, 
but he did not disclose to the investigator that he was also being paid $15.00 per hour for 
the same services, nor did he disclose that he had not told the Town about the double 
dipping. (R. at 310-317, 331-342). 
26. The water project was substantially completed on May 6, 1994. (R. at 11, 
111,331-342). 
27. The remaining work on the water project was completed on June 1, 1994. 
(R.at 11, 113-114). 
28. Despite completion of the water project, Defendant submitted expense 
vouchers for the next 18 months until all the moneys had been depleted. (R. at 11, 32-
109,116-120). 
29. In fact, nearly a year after the project was completed, Mr. Veibell submitted 
an expense voucher showing that he had worked on the project in excess of 16 hours a 
day for a ten day period, for a total of 168 hours. (R. at 11, 120). 
30. Until April of 2008, Cornish Town has been paying off notes relating to the 
water project that would not have been necessary but for the breaches of fiduciary duty 
by Mr. Veibell. (R. at 449-452). 
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31. To this day residents of Cornish Town pay a higher payment for water than 
would be necessary but for the breaches of fiduciary duty by Mr. Veibell. (R. at 449-
452). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
As Mayor of the Town of Cornish, Mayor Veibell had a fiduciary duty to speak 
the truth in matters involving the Town's interests. Failure to do so was fraudulent 
concealment. When Mayor Veibell failed to disclose to the Town that he was already 
being paid $15.00 per hour to perform the inspections that he was asking the Town to pay 
him $10,000 to perform, that was fraudulent concealment. When he then systematically 
prepared the vouchers for the double payments himself, did not seek approval of the 
expenditures from the Town Council and handled those vouchers and payments from his 
home instead of the Town offices, that was fraudulent concealment. When he then 
participated in an investigation by the County Attorney and told the investigator about the 
$10,000 payment by the Town, but not the $15.00 per hour payments, that was fraudulent 
concealment. And when he then used that flawed investigation in which he did not tell 
the whole truth to prevent further investigation, that was fraudulent concealment. The 
Trial Court was in error when it determined that the Town had not made a prima facie 
showing of fraudulent concealment by former Mayor Veibell. 
ARGUMENT 
By showing that the Mayor failed to disclose to the Town that he was being paid 
$15.00 per hour out of borrowed Town funds being disbursed by the water project 
engineers for the same work the Town paid him $10,000 to perform; by showing that the 
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Mayor handled the vouchers for such payments from his home, and without Council 
approval; and by showing that he did not disclose to the Attorney General's investigator 
that he was being paid twice for the same work; the Town of Cornish made a prima facie 
showing of fraudulent concealment. The court erred in taking this case away from a jury. 
I. THE TOWN OF CORNISH MADE A PRIMA FACIE CASE OF 
AFFIRMATIVE FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT BY SHOWING 
THAT MAYOR VEIBELL FAILED TO DISCLOSE MATERIAL 
FACTS WHEN HE HAD A FIDUCIARY DUTY TO MAKE FULL 
DISCLOSURE. 
Floyd Veibell was the Mayor of the Town of Cornish from 1990 to 1998. Thus 
during all the time relevant to the facts analyzed by the Trial Court, Mr. Veibell owed k 
fiduciary duty to the Town of Cornish to "labor under every disability and prohibition 
imposed by law upon trustees relative to the making of personal financial gain from the 
discharge of their trusts." Georgia Dept. of Human Resources v. Sistrunk, 291 S.E.2d 
524, 528 (Ga. 1982)(Overruled on other grounds). See also, Chicago Park Dist. v. 
Kenroy, Inc., 78 111. 2d 555, 561, 402 N.E.2d 181, 185, 37 111. Dec. 291, 295 (111. 1980) 
(Alderman has a fiduciary relationship.); Madsen v. Brown, 701 P.2d 1086, 1095 (Utah 
1985)("The law presumes that a public official conducts himself in good faith."); Clark 
County v. City of Las Vegas. 550 P.2d 779, 794 (Nevada 1976)(Public office holders 
assume the public trust, and u[p]ublic policy demands that an office holder discharge his 
duties with undivided loyalty.") 
That fiduciary duty on the part of Mayor Veibell required that he "speak the truth*' 
and make a full disclosure of his fraudulent activities. Russell/Packard Dev., Inc. v. 
Carson, 78 P.3d 616, 624 (Ut. App. 2003). Mayor Veibell was obligated to make a "full 
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and fair disclosure of all material information pertaining to the transaction." Holland v. 
Moreton, 353 P.2d 989, 994 (Utah 1960). This duty is particularly important where 
Mayor Veibell "was personally profiting and acting on his own behalf as well as 
representing the interests of [the Town of Cornish]." Id.; Page v. Utah Home Fire Ins. 
Co., 391 P.2d 290, 292 (Utah 1964)(Fiduciary agent of insurance company "had an 
affirmative duty to make disclosure of the material facts relating to the insurability and 
the risk involved in this property. This is particularly so because of his self-interest in the 
transaction.") 
The Trial Court was simply in error when it determined that "Veibell5s mere 
nondisclosure to the Attorney General's office and members of the Town Council" was 
not enough to establish a prima facie showing of affirmative fraudulent concealment." 
(R. at 637). "A fiduciary's breach of the 'duty to speak the truth' is sufficient to 
establish fraudulent concealment." Charlesworth v. Reyns, 113 P.3d 1031, 1037 (Ut. 
App. 2005); 
Mayor Veibell, at the time he was inducing the Town to pay him $10,000 so that 
he could take early retirement from Hill Field in order to be on hand to perform 
inspections on the water project, had a duty to disclose to the Town that he had already 
induced the Town's engineers to pay him $15.00 per hour for the same work.1 
1
 Indeed, Mayor Veibell even used the same line—that he needed to take early retirement 
in order to accept the responsibility. See, R. at 313, 331. 
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Likewise, when the Attorney General's office was investigating the matter irj 
1997, Mr. Veibell, who was still the Mayor, owed a fiduciary duty to the Town to 
disclose all he knew about the arrangement, including the fact that he had not told the 
Town that he was already under contract to perform the inspections when he induced the 
town to pay him the additional $10,000. This he did not do. (R. at 5, 451). He wa$ 
under a duty to disclose to the Town and to the Attorney General that he used Town 
funds to pay over $9,000 to a third party to prepare the drinking water source protectioik 
plan that he was under contract to perform. This he did not disclose. (R. at 450) 
While it may be true that in an arms length transaction not involving a fiduciary, 
"mere nondisclosure" would not be enough to establish a prima facie showing of 
affirmative fraudulent concealment, it clearly is sufficient in a case involving the Mayor 
of a Town whose duty it is to protect the Town from the kind of fraud practiced on it by 
Mayor Veibell. 
But in this case there is more than "mere nondisclosure," on the part of Mayor 
Veibell. Mayor Veibell did not have the vouchers for his $15.00 per hour work approved 
by the Town Council as were other Town bills. (R. at 310). Mayor Veibell was careful 
to have the payments for his double-dipping sent to his home rather than to the Town 
offices. (R. at 310). Mayor Veibell continued to submit expense vouchers and to get 
paid, for 18 months after the project was completed. Additionally, Mayor Veibell used 
Town funds to pay over $9,000 to complete his obligation to provide the Town with a 
drinking water source protection plan. Thus, his nondisclosure to the Attorney General 
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and the Town Council was the mere icing on the cake of a long well thought out plan to 
defraud the Town of over $70,000. 
II. GIVEN DEFENDANT'S ACTIONS, IT WAS REASONABLE FOR 
THE PLAINTIFF TO DELAY THE FILING OF ITS CLAIMS. 
Because of its erroneous decision with regard to Plaintiffs prima facie showing of 
affirmative concealment, the court did not address the reasonableness of Plaintiff s delay 
thereafter in bringing these claims. Had the Court addressed that issue it would 
necessarily have denied the Motion for Summary Judgment. The Utah Supreme Court 
has made it clear that summary judgment on this issue is precluded "in all but the clearest 
of cases." Berenda v. Langford, 914 P.2d 45, 54 (Utah 1996). 
This is not such a clear case. Here, the Defendant not only engaged in affirmative 
fraudulent concealment of his crimes, but he also concealed the whole story from the 
County Attorney in order to fraudulently obtain a letter purporting to exonerate him. He 
then used that letter to threaten anyone who dared to question his conduct. 
That type of conduct cannot be rewarded and is exactly what the fraudulent 
concealment branch of the discovery rule is designed to overcome. As the Court put it in 
Berenda, 
"the fraudulent concealment version of the discovery rule aims to navigate 
a balance between two competing policies: (i) that which underlies all 
statutes of limitations, namely, 'to promote justice by preventing surprises 
through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until 
evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have 
disappeared,' (citations omitted) and (ii) that of not allowing a defendant 
who has concealed his wrongdoing to profit from his concealment." 
Berenda, 914 P.2d at 52. 
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The Trial Court erroneously concluded that the fraudulent concealment branch of 
the discovery rule did not apply to Cornish Town's fraud claim because of the statutory 
discovery provision with regard to fraud. (R at 637). In that, the Court was wrongj 
Berenda, 914 P.2d at 52 n. 2 (fraudulent concealment version of the discovery rule 
applies to both fixed statutes of limitation with no internal discovery rule, and to those 
with an internal discovery rule). 
Here, there can be only one conclusion. To allow Defendant to assert the statute of 
limitations after what he has done would award egregious wrongful conduct that goe$ 
beyond fraudulent concealment of his crimes. In this case there was fraudulent 
concealment to be sure. Defendant failed to disclose to the Town that he was already 
being paid by the engineers to perform the inspection work for which he was asking the 
Town to pay him an extra $10,000. He then handled all the vouchers himself and did not 
seek council approval of the vouchers as was the practice with other bills paid by the 
Town. He had the payments made, and the paperwork regarding payment on his $15.00 
per hour contract sent to his home rather than to the Town offices. But the fraud did not 
end there. In the years preceding 1997, members of the Town council and others begaii 
to be suspicious of the Mayor's conduct, so much so that one member requested aflt 
investigation by the County Attorney. It was Mayor Veibell's conduct during that 
investigation that is particularly reprehensible and makes the Town's further delay 
unquestionably reasonable. 
Rather than being forthright and honest in his statements to the investigator and 
the County Attorney, whom Mayor Veibell had supported in the last election, he withheld 
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key points of fact that would have resulted in a far different outcome. For instance, he 
failed to tell the County Attorney or the investigator that when asking for an additional 
$10,000 from the Town, the Town was not informed that he was already being paid for 
that same work. He completely failed to mention that he surreptitiously used Town funds 
to pay a third party over $9,000 to complete a drinking water source protection plan he 
had personally contracted to perform. The County Attorney felt that such information 
would have resulted in a different outcome to his investigation. (R. at 577). 
That investigation, infested by Mr. Veibell's fraudulent nondisclosure, resulted in 
a letter written by the County Attorney—not to the Council member who requested the 
investigation—but to the Mayor suggesting that there had been no wrongdoing. Mayor 
Veibell then used that letter to intimidate any who later tried to question his conduct. The 
Council member who instigated the investigation was even told that if he brought it up 
again, he would be sued for slander. (R. at 450). When such tactics are used by public 
officials to quell scrutiny, there can be no public accountability. In the context of public 
entities, the citizens of a Town cannot fairly be saddled with years of undeserved public 
debt when the culprit escaped early detection through such bullying tactics. 
In the Court below, the Defendant pointed to vague references in the minutes of 
the Town which he contends put the Town on inquiry notice to investigate the matter and 
thus commenced the running of the statute of limitations. That argument might hold 
water had the 1997 investigation never occurred; had Mr. Veibell been honest during that 
investigation; or if Mr. Veibell had not used that investigation to bully Town Council 
members, who serve virtually as volunteers, being paid $5.00 per month, into not 
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investigating further. But given the former Mayor's conduct during that investigation, he 
effectively quelled further scrutiny by the Town through his fraudulent and inappropriate 
conduct. Whether the Court determines that Mr. Veibell's conduct invokes the fraudulent 
concealment version, or the exceptional circumstances version of the discovery rule, it 
would be "irrational and unjust" for Mayor Veibell to get away with what he did to the 
people of his community. 
When the Mayor then approached the Town and demanded that he be appointed 
Town Treasurer, it was not unreasonable for the Town to investigate the events to 
determine if the Town could rightfully deny Mr. Veibell a position of trust. When the 
books of the engineers were obtained, and the magnitude of Mr. Veibel's double dipping 
and the efforts he made to cover it up was determined, it was reasonable for the Town to 
bring this action at that time. 
Under all the facts and circumstances of this case, a court could conclude that the 
statute of limitations is tolled, as a matter of law, but this is not a case where the Court 
was justified in taking the question of the reasonableness of Cornish' delay from the jury. 
"[w]eighing the reasonableness of the plaintiffs conduct in light of the defendant's steps 
to conceal the cause of action necessitates the type of factual findings which preclude 
summary judgment in all but the clearest of cases." Berenda, 914 P.2d at 54. Vague 
references in notes of Town Council meetings that suggest that the Mayor's 
compensation relating to the water project was discussed are not sufficient, as a matter of 
law, to determine that the Town was on notice of the Mayor's efforts to conceal his 
defalcation. In Berenda, the Court analyzed letters exchanged between the parties and 
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held that the references were sufficiently vague that a jury needed to make the 
determination whether the plaintiff had acted reasonably in delay. 
In light of Langford's failure to disclose the Ghostwriter licensing 
agreement when he was allegedly under a duty to disclose it, his express 
statement to Thomas that the Ghostwriter had 'fizzled/ his keeping 
Ghostwriter records in his personal files, and his telling Berenda that 
further questions would lead to a collapse of the merger agreement, we 
cannot agree that, as a matter of law, the two letters demonstrate sufficient 
suspicion of Langford's misappropriation of the Ghostwriter to start the 
running of the statute of limitations on that cause of action, given 
Langford's efforts to conceal it. Berenda, 914 P.2d at 54. 
Likewise in this case, in light of Mr. Veibel's failure to disclose to the Town that 
he was already being paid $15.00 per hour to perform the work when he induced the 
Town to pay him $10,000 for that same work, a disclosure he had a fiduciary duty to 
make. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the Trial Court's granting of 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and remand this case for trial by jury. 
ADDENDUM 
The attached Addendum contains the following: "A" - April 16, 2008 
Memorandum Decision. 
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2008. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED AND DATED THIS 23rd day of September, 
ATKIN LAW OFFICES, PC 
: > 
Blake^. Atkin 
John/V. Mayer 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
19 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am employed by the law firm of Atkin Law Offices, 
P.C, 837 South 500 West, Suite 200, Bountiful, Utah 84010, and that pursuant to Rule 
26(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT was sent to the following this 24th day of 
September, 2008, by the method and to the addresses indicated below: 
Kevin J. Fife 
OLSON & HOGGAN, PC 
BOS. Main Street, #200 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: (435) 752-1551 
Facsimile: (435) 752-2295 
t U.S. Mail 
Hand Delivery 
Overnight Mail 
Facsimile 
utop\ ,<$tf 
Legal Assistant 
20 
Addendum "A" 
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH 
TOWN OF CORNISH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
FLOYD VEIBELL, 
Defendant. 
DECISION 
Civil No. 060102639 
Judge: Thomas L. Willmore 
THE ABOVE MATTER is before the Court pursuant to Defendant Floyd Veibell's 
(hereinafter "Defendant" or "Veibell") Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Strike Plaintiffs 
Supplemental Memorandum in Response to Court ys Questions at the Hearing Dated February 
19, 2008. In preparation of its decision, the Court has reviewed the Defendant's Motions and 
Memoranda in Support, Plaintiffs Memoranda in Opposition, Defendant's Replies in Support, 
Defendant's Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiffs 
Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition, Defendant's Supplemental Reply Memorandum in 
Support, Plaintiffs Reply to Defendant's Supplemental Memorandum Regarding Statute of 
Limitations, the Court's Memorandum Decisions dated February 21, 2007 and November 29, 
2007, respectively, each document and affidavit submitted before the Court, and the applicable 
case law and statutory provisions. A hearing was also held on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss on 
February 19, 2008. Following the hearing, Plaintiff submitted an unsolicited Supplemental 
Memorandum in Response to Court's Questions at the Hearing Dated February 19, 2008 with 
supporting affidavits. As noted above, Defendant responded with ^Motion to Strike the 
unsolicited Memorandum which is also now before the Court. Having considered the foregoing, 
the Court issues this Decision. 
I. Defendant Floyd Veibell's Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Supplemental Memorandum in 
Response to Court fs Questions at the Hearing Dated February 19, 2008. 
Following the February 19, 2008 hearing on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss^ Plaintiff 
Town of Cornish (hereinafter "Cornish" or "Plaintiff") filed an unsolicited Memorandum in 
1 
632. 
Response to questions the Court propounded to Plaintiff during the hearing and to which Plaintiff 
felt it was "not able to give . complete answers on the spur of the moment." As noted above, the 
Court did not request additional briefing on the questions asked at the hearing and the Rules of 
Civil Procedure do not allow an unsolicited Memorandum to be filed. Plaintiff cites two cases 
where post-hearing supplemental briefings were considered by the trial court; however, in both 
cases, the trial courts had requested such briefing from the parties. Here, Plaintiff had more than 
one year to conduct discovery and submit any evidence it felt was sufficient to support its case, 
either in its several supplemental memoranda filed prior to the hearing or at the hearing. 
Furthermore, the Court extended the original discovery period at Plaintiffs request, see 
Memorandum Decision, dated February 21, 2007, and allowed Plaintiff an additional two weeks 
to provide the Court with very specific evidence relating to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss prior 
to the hearing. {See Memorandum Decision, dated November 29, 2007.) 
Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff was provided with sufficient time to prepare for 
the hearing on Defendant' § Motion to Dismiss and to provide the Court with any evidence it felt 
was relevant. Furthermore, the Plaintiff has failed to set forth good cause sufficient to justify 
review of the unsolicited Memorandum. Accordingly, the Court grants Defendant's Motion to 
Strike and will not consider Plaintiffs unsolicited Supplemental Memorandum in Response to 
Court's Questions at the Hearing Dated February 19, 2008. 
II. Defendant Floyd Veibell's Motion to Dismiss. 
On or about December 12, 2006, Defendant Floyd Veibell filed a Motion to Dismiss 
Plaintiffs Complaint. However, as has noted by the Court in its prior Decisions, since both 
parties have submitted evidence outside of the pleadings, the Court will treat the Motion to 
Dismiss as a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
In the instant matter, Floyd Veibell served as the Mayor of the Town of Cornish during 
the years 1990 through 1998. In 1993, the Cornish Town Council approved Resolution 93-2, the 
purpose of which was to "(1) provide constant supervision and administration of the Cornish 
culinary water system project through completion, (2) provide the necessary manpower to set up 
monitoring and recording procedures for new water quality requirements mandated by Congress 
and administered by the Environmental Protection Agency, and (3) develop a Drinking Water 
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Source Protection Plan as required by new State of Utah regulations [hereinafter known as the 
"Water Project"] " (Compl at ffi| 6-7 ) In 1993, Defendant Veibell was appointed by the Town 
Council to manage the Water Project and his annual salary was increased by $10,000 00 as 
compensation for the added responsibility In addition to the increase in salary however, Plaintiff 
alleges that Veibell was also being paid $15 00 per hour by the Town of Cornish for other work 
he was performing for Cornish as an independent sub-contractor on the same Water Project. 
Cornish alleges that Veibell never disclosed to the Town Council that he was being paid twice for 
the same work. 
Plaintiff alleges that during the years 1993 through 1997, Veibell submitted expense 
vouchers in various amounts for services he claimed to have performed relating to the Water 
Project. However, none of the vouchers or payments were presented to the Town Council for 
approval and after the Water Project was completed in 1994, Defendant Veibell allegedly 
continued to submit expense vouchers for the next three years relating to work on the completed 
Water Project. The Town of Cornish claims that not only was Veibell paid twice by Cornish to 
complete the Water Project, but he never completed the Water Project himself, paying a third 
party approximately $9,000.00 out of city funds to complete it. Finally, between 1993 and 1997, 
the record shows that there were discussions involving the Town Council or members therefrom 
regarding concerns about Veibell and his involvement in the Water Project; furthermore, in 1997, 
the Attorney General's Office conducted a criminal investigation of Veibell's conduct and found 
no evidence of wrongdoing. See Letter from Scott L. Wyatt, County Attorney, Cache County, 
Utah, to C. Floyd Veibell, Mayor, Town of Cornish (May 5, 1997). 
The Town of Cornish took no further action until it filed its Complaint on November 17, 
2006. Veibell, shortly thereafter, moved to dismiss the Complaint arguing that Cornish's four 
alleged causes of action—(1) breach of fiduciary duty; (2) money by false pretenses; (3) 
conversion; and (4) fraud—are all barred by their applicable statutes of limitations. Veibell argues 
that the four year statute of limitations set forth in UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 78-12-25(3) 
governs and bars Cornish's first and second causes of action for "breach of fiduciary duty" and 
"money by false pretenses," respectively. Cornish claims in response that the applicable statute of 
limitations for its first and second causes of action has been tolled by the "(equitable) discovery 
rule," affirmative misrepresentations made by Veibell, and exceptional circumstances. Veibell next 
argues that Cornish's third cause of action for "conversion" is governed and barred by the three 
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year statute of limitations set forth in UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 78-12-26 Cornish again argues 
that the statute of limitations is tolled by the "(equitable) discovery rule" as well as concealment 
and affirmative misrepresentations made by Veibell Finally, Veibell argues that Cornish's fourth 
cause of action for "fraud" is barred by the three year statute of limitation set forth in UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED § 78-12-26(3). In response, Cornish claims that the fraud statute's internal 
"discovery rule" operates to toll the statute of limitations See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-26(3) 
Mr Veibell claims that all of the above-noted statute of limitations began to run, at the 
latest, in either 1993, 1995, 1997, 2000 or 2001; thereby, barring Cornish's four causes of action 
which were all filed in 2006 Cornish however argues that the applicable statutes of limitations 
have been tolled as the facts forming the basis for the cause of action were not and could not have 
been discoverable until the preparation of the Complaint in this case, even after reasonable 
diligence and inquiry Furthermore, Cornish alleges that Veibell intentionally withheld information 
(i.e., during the 1997 criminal investigation finding no evidence of wrongdoing) that would have 
otherwise enabled Cornish to have discovered the alleged fraud and other causes of action in this 
case, thus invoking the "discovery rule" so as to toll the applicable statute of limitations. 
In accordance with Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, "summary judgment 
is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). When a motion for 
summary judgment is made, the affidavit of the nonmoving party must contain "specific 
evidentiary facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Treloggan v. Treloggan, 699 
P.2d 747 (Utah 1985); see also Webster v. Sill 675 P.2d 1170, 1172 (Utah 1983) (holding that 
the affiant's "mere assertion that an issue of fact exists without a proper evidentiary foundation to 
support that assertion is insufficient to preclude the granting of a summary judgment motion"). 
Furthermore, "[t]o successfully defend against a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving 
party must set forth facts sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's 
case. Failure to do so with regard to any of the essential elements of that party's claim will result 
in a conclusion that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Anderson Dev. 
Co, v. Tobias, 116 P.3d 323, 332 (Utah 2005). However, "doubts or uncertainties concerning 
issues of fact properly presented, or the nature of inferences to be drawn from the facts, are to be 
construed in a light most favorable to the party opposing the summary judgment." Webster, 675 
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P 2d at 1172, see also Bowen v Riverton City, Utah, 656 P 2d 434 (Utah 1982) 
Furthermore, as to application of the discovery rule in Utah, the Courts have indicated that 
the discovery rule operates to toll the statute of limitations "until the discovery of facts forming 
the basis for the cause of action " Id. Moreover, the discovery rule "operates either when 
provided for by statute (the 'statutory discovery rule') or when required by equity (the 'equitable 
discovery rule') The statute may be tolled under the equitable discovery rule when either 
exceptional circumstances or the defendant's [affirmative] fraudulent concealment prevents the 
plaintiff from timely filing suit " Id. (citation omitted) The courts have also indicated that the 
application of the discovery rule "involves a subsidiary factual determination—the point at which 
a person reasonably should know that he has suffered a legal injury " Colosimo v. Roman 
Catholic Bishop, 156 P 3d 806, 810 (Utah 2007) Nonetheless, when the plaintiff fails to make a 
prima facie showing of fraudulent concealment (i.e., affirmative steps), the equitable discovery 
rule cannot be invoked to toll the applicable statutes of limitations, as a matter of law, since the 
plaintiff would have failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to affirmative concealment. 
See Berenda v. Langford, 914 P 2d 45 (Utah 1996). 
Here, Cornish first seeks to toll the statutes of limitations through application of the 
"equitable discovery rule" to its first three causes of action for "breach of fiduciary duty;" "money 
under false pretenses;" and "conversion." Under the exceptional circumstances doctrine of the 
"equitable discovery rule," the statute of limitations period is tolled "where the case presents 
exceptional circumstances and the application of the general rule would be irrational or unjust, 
regardless of any showing that the defendant... prevented the discovery of the cause of action." 
Colosimo, 156P.3dat812. The Courts have held that for this exception to apply, "an initial 
showing must be made that the plaintiff did not know and could not reasonably have discovered 
the facts underlying the cause of action in time to commence an action within [the applicable 
limitations period]." Id. (citation omitted). Next, the Courts have indicated that the fraudulent 
concealment version of the "equitable discovery rule" applies so as to toll the running of the 
limitations period when "a plaintiff does not become aware of the cause of action because of the 
defendant's concealment or misleading conduct." Id. (citation omitted). More specifically, in order 
for the fraudulent concealment doctrine to apply, 
[P]laintiff must demonstrate either (1) that the plaintiff neither knew nor 
reasonably should have known of the facts underlying his or her cause of action 
befpre the fixed limitations period expired; or (2) that notwithstanding the 
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plaintiffs actual or constructive knowledge of the facts underlying his or her cause 
of action within the limitations period, a reasonably diligent plaintiff may have 
delayed in filing his or her complaint until after the statute of limitations expired 
[Emphasis added ] 
Colosimo, 156 P 3d at 816 (citation omitted). 
Also, in Berenda v. Langford, supra, the court indicated that "when a plaintiff alleges that 
a defendant took affirmative steps to conceal the plaintiffs cause of action .. [as is the case here,] 
the plaintiff can avoid full operation of the discovery rule by making a, prima facie showing of 
fraudulent concealment and then demonstrating that given the defendant's actions, a reasonable 
plaintiff would not have discovered the claim earlier." Berenda, 914 P. 2d at 54 (emphasis added). 
After reviewing the parties' arguments, both in their pleadings as well as at the hearing 
held on February 19, 2008, the Court finds that the Town of Cornish has failed to make a prima 
facie showing of affirmative fraudulent concealment by Defendant Veibell. While the Town of 
Cornish alleges that Veibell's mere nondisclosure to the Attorney General's Office and members 
of the Town Council constitutes affirmative fraudulent concealment under the "equitable 
discovery rule," the courts have indicated that a plaintiff must show that affirmative steps have 
been taken to conceal, which the Court finds to be beyond the mere nondisclosure alleged in the 
present matter. See generally Berenda v. Longford, supra. Accordingly, while a determination of 
whether the Plaintiff was reasonably diligent in investigating the allegations set forth in Plaintiffs 
Complaint sufficient to toll the statute of limitations requires a subsidiary factual determination, 
the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to affirmative 
concealment by Veibell and as a result, Plaintiffs first three causes of action fail as a matter of 
law. Id. at 54. Therefore, as a matter of law, since Plaintiff has failed to make zprima facie 
showing of fraudulent concealment, the equitable discovery rule cannot be invoked to toll the 
applicable statutes of limitations, respectively, and as such, Plaintiffs first three causes of action 
are hereby barred. 
With respect to Cornish's fourth cause of action alleging fraud, the statutory provision of 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 78-12-26(3) operates to toll the running of the statutory limitations 
period of three years until a plaintiff "either discover[s] or should have discovered his or her cause 
of action." Colosimo, 156 P.3d at 811. Furthermore, concerning an action for fraud, the "plaintiff 
is deemed to have discovered his action when he has actual knowledge of the fraud 'or by 
reasonable diligence and inquiry should know, the relevant facts of the fraud perpetrated against 
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him [emphasis added] " Id. (citation omitted) Accordingly, the Courts have held that in such 
circumstance, "if a party has knowledge of some underlying facts, then that party must reasonably 
investigate potential causes of action because the limitations period will run " Id. (citations 
omitted) 
Here, the Cornish Town Council convened on October 14, 1993 and discussed the fact 
that Veibell was being "paid as a contractor for his work on the new system " See Minutes from 
the Cornish Town Council Meeting, Cornish, Utah (October 14, 1993) On February 9, 1995, the 
Cornish Town Council again met and discussed the fact that Veibell had been "hired by the town 
to inspect the water system for $15.00 per hour from project beginning to end." See Minutes from 
the Cornish Town Council Meeting, Cornish, Utah (February 9, 1995); see also Memorandum re: 
Cornish Town Water System Improvements Project from William S Bigelow, P E. (February 9, 
1995) It also appears that during the year 1995, an informal meeting was held with Town Council 
members where Veibell's involvement in the Water Project was discussed See Affidavit of Kelly 
Naegle, ffl[ 3-5; Affidavit of Dale Buxton ffl[ 3-6. In 1997, as noted above, the Town initiated a 
criminal investigation of Veibell regarding his involvement with the Water Project and his 
handling of public funds. See Letter from Scott L. Wyatt to Mayor Veibell, supra. Finally, on May 
8, 1997, the Town Council met and discussed the issue of Veibell receiving an extra $15.00 per 
hour for his work on the Water Project. See Minutes from the Cornish Town Council Meeting, 
Cornish, Utah (May 8, 1997). 
Based on the evidence in the record and as partially noted above, it is clear to the Court 
that the Town knew enough during the years 1993 through 1997 to investigate a potential 
lawsuit. Particularly, the Court finds it quite telling that the Town had sufficient facts in 1997 to 
suspect wrongdoing and request that the Attorney General's Office conduct a criminal 
investigation. It is therefore apparent to the Court that the Town knew enough or through 
reasonable diligence should have known enough relevant facts concerning Veibell's alleged 
fraudulent conduct during the years 1993 through 1997 to have pursued a cause of action of fraud 
prior to 2000 (three years later). See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-26(3). Based on the undisputed 
facts of this matter, the Court finds that Plaintiff had ample opportunity to investigate and assert 
its cause of action for fraud prior to the year 2000. The Town Council could easily have requested 
and reviewed any and all pertinent financial documents and/or other relevant documents they now 
rely on in support of their claims. Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff discovered and/or had at 
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its disposal sufficient information m 1997 to bring the present action for fraud by the year 2000 as 
it had "actual knowledge of the fraud cor by reasonable diligence and inquiry should have know, 
the relevant facts of the fraud perpetrated against him '" Colosimo, 156 P 3d at 811 (citation 
omitted), see also UTAH CODE ANN § 78-12-26(3) 
While Plaintiff argues that "weighing the reasonableness of the plaintiffs conduct in light 
of the defendant's steps to conceal the cause[s] of action necessitates the type of factual findings 
which preclude summary judgment in all but the clearest of cases," Berenda, 914 P 2d at 54, the 
Court finds that here, Plaintiff has failed to make a prima facie showing of "affirmative" 
fraudulent concealment and as a matter of law the equitable discovery rule cannot be invoked to 
toll the applicable statutes of limitations Furthermore, it is clear to the Court that the Town of 
Cornish should have reasonably known or discovered at least some evidence sufficient to bring its 
cause of action for fraud prior to the year 2000 since, based on the record and the evidence set 
forth by the parties and as referenced herein, the Town should have known or at least made 
further diligent inquiry no later than 1997 
Therefore, even in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party (the Town), the Court 
finds that no genuine issues of material fact exist and that Defendant Veibell is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, the Court grants Defendant Veibell's Motion to 
Dismiss, treated as a motion for summary judgment, and counsel for Defendant Veibell is directed 
to prepare an order in conformance herewith. 
Dated this f (p day of April, 2008 
BY THE COURT: 
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